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Does the Emperor Really Have New Clothes? 







Since the EU is an extremely complicated political entity it has numerous different 
political and legal layers.
1
 One of these is the distribution of powers between the Union and 
the Member States. The study of the new regime of Union competences is highly relevant in 
these years since it allows us to arrive at important conclusions. These conclusions are not 
solely of constitutional character,
2
 but also highlight certain general tendencies. Interestingly, 
the history of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe
3
 was a sharp indication that a 
federal scenario is still unimaginable under recent socio-political conditions, however, this did 
not mean that the drafters of the treaty neglected the use of certain elements of federalism 
while designing the new European constitutional architecture. The Post-Lisbon regime of 
vertical division of powers is one of the best examples of this, since it reflects an evidently 




This brief article is not a simple description of the vertical distribution of powers in the 
Union,
5
 but aims to reflect upon certain dimensions thereof from a critical point of view. 
Basically, three theses will be elaborated in order to highlight some controversies surrounding 
the recent regulation of Union and Member State competences. It must also be mentioned that 
the following theses are by no means definitive statements; they are merely starting points for 
the broader academic discussion. 
The theses are as follows: 
(1.) The reform of competences introduced by the Lisbon Treaty can be regarded neither a 
real revolution nor even a significant evolution, since it is of a strong conservative nature. 
That being said, the transformation of the legal framework of the vertical division of powers 
did not establish a qualitatively new regime. It only systematized and codified the 
achievements of the earlier case-law of the European Court of Justice (thereafter: ECJ) and 
some former treaty provisions. 
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(2.) However, the real achievement of the changes is the coherent introduction of a federal 
attitude and vocabulary. The text of both the Treaty on the European Union (thereafter: TEU) 
and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (thereafter TFEU) relies on essential 
terms rooted in federalism such as for instance “exclusive”, “shared” or “member state” 
competences. Therefore, the distribution of powers between the Union and the Member State 
is articulated in a clear federal way. Indeed, it can be regarded a real novelty compared to the 
prior-Lisbon regime evolving in the context of delicate and sophisticated political and judicial 
compromises. 
(3.) Lastly, although the new regime was obviously inspired by a federal mindset it cannot 
be equated with a real federative government. The supranational level is incomparably 
“weaker” and less powerful in substantive terms than the central governmental level of real 
federations. Many important competences that would make the EU a real and functioning 
federal state are still lacking. As a result, fears of a silently emerging United States of Europe 
or European Super State are manifestly unfounded in a public law sense. 
 
2. An imperfect conservative reform 
 
In the words of political philosophy, “conservative reform” seems to be a suitable term to 
describe what happened with the distribution of competences between the EU and the 
Member States following the Lisbon reforms. Although it would be rather tempting to 
consider this term an apparent contradiction, this is certainly not the case. Conservative 
political philosophy generally accepts that the change in the order of things is both 
unavoidable and necessary. Therefore, conservative authors do not deny the necessity of 
transformation, what they frequently and vehemently debate are its nature and features. For 
example: Michael Oakeshott argues that a slow and gradual, that is to say, spontaneous 
transformation is much more favorable than a line of fast, direct and intentional acts aiming to 
comprehensively reform a certain segment of life.
6
 Thus, “conservative reform” is a plausible 
term for characterizing those processes that gradually, softly and organically change a given 
situation shifting into another one. 
As a preliminary remark it should also be mentioned that the reform of the entire system of 
European Union competences has been a constant claim of both the European political elite 
and the European civil society in the last fifteen years. Besides featuring in the general 
scholarly and political discussion, it was also reflected in official European Union documents. 
A declaration attached to the Nice Treaty
7
 had already mentioned the necessity of this reform 
which was one of the main issues that gave birth to the Laeken Declaration
8
 and the following 
constitution-making process leading to enactment of the Lisbon Treaty. To be precise, both 
declarations emphasized the necessity of a clear delimitation of the European Union and 
Member State competences. The declaration on the future of the European Union attached to 
the Nice Treaty simply pointed out the problem on an official level, since it indicated it as one 
of the main questions to be discussed in this respect.
9
 The Laeken Declaration provided a 
more detailed analysis, broadening the scope of official awareness. Its main message was that 
the division of competences had to be clarified and simplified; furthermore, this regime was 
also to work in a more transparent way. In order to achieve these aims, it explicitly claimed a 
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“clearer distinction” among the different types of competences including the exclusive ones, 
the shared ones, and the competences of Member States.
10
 In sum, the reconsideration of the 
former regime of the distribution of powers between the supranational and Member State 
levels of government was an essential component of the constitution-making process launched 
in 2001; however its precise substance was still open to debate. 
Upon analyzing the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty one may conclude that 
they did not radically transform the existing competence regime although they integrated a 
new framework and various new elements into the corpus of European public law. The actual 
setting of the division of competences is based on both the TEU and TFEU. The TEU 
establishes the underlying principles for sharing and exercising competences in Article 3 and 
4 with special regard to the demarcation of Member States competences as well as the limits 
of Union competences. In addition, Title I TFEU (Articles 2 – 6) sets forth detailed rules by 
defining the nature and scope of the various competences as well as listing their specific 
policy areas. Thus, as of recently, the distribution of competences is spread out in seven 
independent articles. That being said, the European Union received a newly designed legal 
framework for exercising competences incorporated into the treaty architecture. It should not 
be forgotten, that in the earlier phases of the development of integration the problems of the 
vertical division of powers were decided by the ECJ on a case-by-case basis.
11
 
However, although the emergence of such a new “competence clause”,12 the beating heart 
of each federal system, is certainly a new element of European public law, emphasis must be 
laid on the fact that the drafters of the treaty simply codified pre-existing solutions in the great 
majority of the cases. Indeed, the substance of this “competence clause” consisting of seven 
treaty provisions predominantly stem from pre-Lisbon public law developments. The majority 
of these were former treaty provisions and various earlier case-law achievements; both  
generally approved by the communis opinio doctorum of legal scholars. Therefore, this 
transformation can only be termed a “conservative reform” instead of a real revolution as the 
focal point thereof were the developments lying in the past. All in all, the Lisbon reform 
refined the legal framework of the division of competences – e.g. it created new articles 
precisely delimiting Union and Member State competences, it also introduced new terms into 
the text of these articles –, nonetheless it did not add any qualitatively new elements that 
would call into question the former constitutional setting.  
As a first illustration, the case of exclusive Union competences should be mentioned. 
Article 3 TFEU precisely sets forth those five areas – the customs union, competition rules for 
the internal market, monetary policy for those member states who participate in the final stage 
of monetary integration, conservation of marine biological resources, and common 
commercial policy – where the EU has exclusive competence in the classical sense of the 
term. Moreover, the second paragraph of this article handles the question of the conclusion of 
international agreements. It sets forth that the Union possesses exclusive competence if the 
conclusion of an international agreement is required by a legislative act, or is necessary to 
exercise an internal competence, or insofar as it may affect common rules or alter their scope. 
Let’s take a closer look at these exclusive competences! The exclusivity of the Union’s 
competence in the area of customs unions and monetary policy of the Euro-zone would not 
have been seriously questioned in the pre-Lisbon setting. Both the spirit and the wording of 
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the Treaty on the European Community made this obvious.
13
 Furthermore, the academic 
literature also accepted their exclusivity without reservation.
14
 In addition, emphasis must also 
be put on the fact that the ECJ had already stressed the exclusive nature of the European 
Community’s competences in the area of common commercial policy in relation to trade in 
goods
15
 and the conservation of marine biological resources with respect to fishery.
16
 The sole 
novelty among these competences is the appearance of the establishment of competition rules 
with regard to the functioning of the internal market as it has not been considered an exclusive 
competence so far. However, the ECJ has already accepted its exclusive nature in a 
judgment.
17
 Furthermore, the presence of the case-law of the ECJ is also overwhelming 
regarding the provisions related to external competences, since they also rely on certain 
principles emerging from it.
18
 
Thus, the list of exclusive competences as framed by the Lisbon Treaty is definitely not a 
surprising one in the light of earlier constitutional developments. If one also checks the list of 
shared competences incorporated in Article 4 TFEU one will immediately realize that it 
essentially mirrors the pre-Lisbon state of affairs.
19
 What is important in this respect is that 
the precise “configuration of power sharing”20 can only be determined if one reads them 
together with the detailed rules of the relevant chapters of the TFEU.
21
 In conclusion, it can be 
argued that the substantive scope of the treaties – although the relevant provisions were 
considerably retailored and refined by the drafters of the treaty on a textual level – have not 
changed substantially.  
In fact, by introducing these two categories of competences the drafters of the treaty tried 
to create a coherent setting for the division of powers between the European Union and the 
Member States by arranging the earlier fragmented developments and achievements into a 
logically coherent, essentially federal framework. However, and this is the most striking 
point, it failed to transform the existing state of affairs substantially. Undoubtedly, this was a 
reform; nonetheless it was not more than a precise systematization of the pre-existing 
components. That is why it can be labelled a “conservative reform”. 
However, contrary to all systematization efforts other parts of the new regime are still 
illogical and incoherent.
22
 One could say that this reform also had its internal limits mostly 
due to certain political controversies. One can find references in Article 4 (3-4) TFEU – it 
should not be forgotten that Article 4 is principally dedicated to shared competences – to other 
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types of competences. Research, technological development, space, development cooperation 
and humanitarian aid are the main fields where the European Union has “a certain” 
competence. However, surprisingly, these competences can only imply activities (including 
the implementation of programs and common policies) that do not prevent Member States 
from exercising their competence on the same fields. One thing is clear from this wording: 
these do not fit the classical federal tripartition of competences by their very nature. They are 
not shared competences as they cannot overrule the same Member States competences, 
therefore, their place in Article 4 is highly questionable.
23
  
Parallel competence might be a proper choice to name them, but in reality this seems 
controversial since it can hardly be imagined that they will never intersect the same 
competences of Member States, as would be the ideal case. For instance, European research 
and innovation framework programs necessarily interfere with the same national activities to 
a certain degree as they set forth research priorities and allocates research funds.
24
 Thus, the 
exercise of the Union’s “parallel” competence in the field of research and development is 
always capable of partially influencing the same national policies; that is, in practice the 
national authorities necessarily loose some segments of their autonomy. Therefore, it may 
seem a pure illusion to talk about parallel competences in this respect, since the way the 
Union level exercises its “parallel” competences necessarily affects the attitudes of national 
players thereby also influencing their competences. 
Furthermore, the following categories of competences are even more obscure and 
problematic than those mentioned earlier. Article 5 TFEU empowers the Union to exercise 
certain coordinating competences in the field of economic policies, employment policies and 
social policies. It is argued that the main reason for the emergence of these co-ordinating 
competences was a political compromise, since in the framework of the Convention the 
parties could not reach an agreement on the question whether these areas should be put under 
the umbrella of shared or complementary competences.
25
 Lastly, Article 6 TFEU lists seven 
so-called complementary competences
26
 by emphasizing that the acts of the Union in these 
matters cannot even result in the harmonization of the rules of the Member States.
27
 Thus, the 
post-Lisbon competence regime is also composed of numerous atypical competences and that 
makes the whole picture even more complicated.  
In sum, the new regime of power distribution is also based on atypical competences 
besides the classical ones. They can be labeled as parallel, co-ordinating or supplementary 
competences. Common to all of them is that in case they are exercised by the Union this 
cannot lead to the expiry of the own competences of the Member States, however, they 
definitely influences those. That is to say, they fluctuate somewhere between the shared and 
exclusive Member States competences, therefore their substantial scope and real normative 
value still remains a question. One may argue that co-ordinating competences would be 
normatively more powerful than complementary ones;
28
 nevertheless the real added value of 
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this division is unclear yet. All in all, their introduction as sui generis categories is quite 
confusing in from a constitutional point of view, therefore, their reconsideration and 
simplification should be an important task for the next revision of the Treaties. Moreover, 
their presence also indicates that the internal limits of this reform are closely related to the 
controversial nature of European political reality. 
Thus, some further systematization and clarification would still be favorable in order to 
make the recently installed regime more transparent and comprehensible. Until such time it 
cannot be argued that the Laeken goals were fully and perfectly achieved. 
 
3. A federal approach and vocabulary introduced 
 
Based on the above, the Lisbon reform did not substantially modify the actual status quo of 
the division of competences between the European Union and the Member States. However, 
this lack of substantial transformation does by no means lead to the conclusion that it did not 
bring any new elements into the constitutional architecture. Both the spirit and the wording of 
the articles dealing with competence distribution changed comprehensively, unambiguously 
indicating a federal-turn in the attitude of the founding treaties. 
If one examines the prior-Lisbon framework of distribution of competences one striking 
feature will appear at the outset. The treaties – both the TEU and Treaty establishing the 
European Community (thereafter TEC) – were seemingly reluctant in applying classic terms 
of federalism while setting forth precise rules. Of course, this was not surprising in the era 
when the Community was born, since the first, embryonic decades were preeminently 
dedicated to economic integration, namely the establishment of a common market. Purely 
political questions were of a secondary importance on the agenda of the evolving Community. 
In addition, the failure of both the European Political Community and the European Defence 
Community in the 1950s sharply pointed out how limited the range was for any ambitions of 
supranational and political integration at that point in time.
29
  
However, the integration process had gradually acquired a political character,
30
 while the 
Maastricht reforms, with special regard to the establishment of the three-pillars structure, 
definitely paved the way for a political union. And, questions on the federal nature of this 
continuously evolving political integration could legitimately have been posed in this 
context.
31
 However, the drafters of the treaty did not insist on the reconsideration of 
competences in a federal manner neither in Amsterdam, nor in Nice. In a perhaps slightly 
surprising way, the last version of the TEC kept the a legal framework that was essentially 
designed at the very beginning of the integration.
32
 Thus, although the political, economic and 
even the judicial context of the integration had been transformed to a considerable degree, the 
legal provisions dedicated to the exercise of the competences remained essentially within the 
framework of a non-federal paradigm. 
When defining the exercise of the powers of the Community, the TEC predominantly 
relied on terms such as “task”,33 “purposes”,34 “activities”,35 “limits”,36 or “powers conferred 
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upon”.37 Although both the substantive scope of the treaties and the legislative activities of the 
Community could be coherently explained employing these concepts,
38
 they were unable to 
deliver such a clear and structured picture as a federalist setting could have offered.
39
 One 
may conclude that the legal framework of competence distribution dealt with its subject-
matter in a rather pragmatist and operationalist attitude within the prior-Lisbon constellation. 
That being said, the system relied on vague terms with no explicit constitutional meaning. 
Their presence resulted in a lack of solid constitutional background; indeed, the precise 
content and scope of competences had to be established by the ECJ on a step-by-step basis.
40
  
The sole exception was the expression “exclusive competence” that was added to the TEC 
by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.
41
 Its inclusion might have been regarded as a sign of a silent 
transformation, since it was the first moment when a clearly federal concept appeared in the 
founding treaties. However, albeit very tempting, such a conclusion should be considered with 
caution. First of all, it should be borne in mind that the term “exclusive competence” was 
solely mentioned in the context of subsidiarity.
42
 Hence, it was not introduced as a sui generis 
constitutional concept in order to indicate the exclusive sphere of the Community’s 
competences. It only had an explanatory and illustrative value by pointing out that the 
requirement of subsidiarity could not be applied where the Community had an exclusive 
competence. Therefore, it could not be considered more than the counterpoint of shared 
competences subjected to the requirements of both subsidiarity and proportionality. The only 
conclusion that could have been deduced from the appearance of this term in Article 3b is that 
the Community had certain exclusive competences, but their precise area and scope remained 
unsettled on the level of the treaty. 
As a result, the prior-Lisbon constitutional regime was seemingly unenthusiastic in 
applying classic federal concepts to describe the existing system of vertical division of 
competences. This is most likely due to the fact that the idea of euro-federalism had already 
been seriously challenged in the early history of the European integration – just think of De 
Gaulle’s skeptical, deeply intergovernmental attitude.43 Indeed, by the federally-neutral 
phrasing of the provisions concerned the Member States as masters of the treaties did not 
want to touch upon such a delicate question, namely the federal functioning of the 
Community, that could have threatened the status quo of integration, potentially jeopardizing 
all achievements already realized. It could easily be imagined that a complete or partial 
introduction of a classical federal phrasing into the text of the treaties would immediately 
have fostered strong political counter-reactions centered around the supremacy of national 
sovereignty. 
However, this completely changed since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, it 
introduced a completely new approach in the design of the constitutional framework 
dedicated to the organization of the exercise of competences.
44
 In fact, by the introduction of a 
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so-called “competence-clause” a qualitatively new attitude has just begun to fertilize 
European public law on an official level. The new “competence clause” – even if it is an 
incoherent and fragmented provision since some components are incorporated in the TEU, 
while others are regulated in the TFEU – can structurally be compared to those of the classic 
federal constitutions. Thus, it is of a seemingly federal nature, therefore, it can be regarded as 
a real improvement in comparison to the earlier attitude of the founding treaties generally 
neglecting federalism in this respect. That is to say, the conceptual framework in which the 
drafters of the treaty regard and manage the question of distribution of competences changed 
to a great extent. 
There are some examples for illustrating the above statement. Firstly, both Article 4 (1) 
and 5 (2) TEU stress that the competences not “conferred upon the Union in the Treaties 
remain with the Member States”.45 By attributing such a high level of importance to the 
definition of the precise sphere of the Member State competences – all competences that were 
not transferred to the Union by an explicit treaty provision in abstracto – the drafters of the 
treaty subscribed to the very core of federalist thinking. More concretely, they accepted one of 
its basic tenets that in a federalist political system two precisely delimited spheres of 
governments work together in the same constitutional framework.
46
 Obviously, these levels of 
government may cooperate in various ways, as the examples of dual and cooperative types of 
federalist structures may illustrate,
47
 but the division of these two spheres of government 
remains fundamental. That is to say, these articles reflect strong federal commitments. Thus, 
in the eyes of the constitutionalizing power, the EU comprises and integrates two different 
politico-legal entities, the supranational, Union level and the Member States. 
Furthermore, as a logical consequence of the earlier, apart from emphasizing the 
importance of the equality of Member States before the treaties Article 4 (2) TEU lists the key 
areas that will remain in the hands of the Member States. In doing so, this provision delimits 
the core of the political and constitutional existence of the Member States, that is, 
competences that cannot be overruled by acts of the Union. These can be grouped around the 
following key points: (i.) fundamental political and constitutional structures including the 
system of local and regional self-government; (ii.) defence of the territorial integrity; (iii.) 
maintenance of law and order on its territory; and (iv.) national security. These broader terms 
should be translated to the conventional language of constitutional law, but if we do so, it is 
possible to conclude that (i.) the competence to set up the internal constitutional and political 
structure autonomously; (ii.) military competences and (iii.) police competences will certainly 
preserve their place in the constitutional armoury of the Member States.
48
 It is worthwhile 
mentioning at this point, that such a delimitation of exclusive Member State competences 
echoes to a great extent the US federal approach granting general “police power” to states.49 
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In sum, this is another important point to substantiate how close the recent constitutional 
philosophy of the Lisbon Reform is to the general heritage of federalism. 
Furthermore, even if it is nothing more than a commonplace in the world of constitutional 
law, the division of exclusive, shared and Member States competences also reflects a 
definitively federal attitude. The definition of these groups of competences is a logical 
consequence of a constitutional philosophy that strictly delimits two distinct spheres of 
government, that of the federal or supranational and that of the Member State. Precise patterns 
of such a threefold division of competences are incorporated into the federal constitution of 
both Germany or Austria.
50
 So, the drafters of the treaty followed the European line of 
federalist thinking on this point.  
Moreover, the expressis verbis listing of exclusive and shared competences also implies 
another essential principle of federalism. This is the principle of enumerated powers setting 
forth that the federal level has no general scope of jurisdiction since its acts must always be 
linked to one of the competences enumerated in the text of the constitution or founding 
treaty.
51
 US constitutional history teaches us that this principle may even have such a broad 
reading that made it possible to infer the doctrine of implied powers
52
 with respect to 
enumerated federal powers. Nonetheless, its very core, i.e. that the federal government is able 
to act only if an explicit or implicit authorization emanates from the constitution, is still one of 
the essential cornerstones of federal legal architecture. 
Considering the above, it is certainly not an overstatement to submit that an apparent 
federal-turn has taken place in the constitutional philosophy of the founding treaties. As for 
competence sharing between the Union and the Members States, the Lisbon reforms 
introduced both a clear federal attitude and a more or less coherent federal vocabulary. It is 
even more apparent if one compares the actual constitutional framework to that prior to 
Lisbon. Article 4 (1) and 5 (2) TFEU reveal that the drafters of the treaty regarded the Union 
as a political entity with two distinct levels of government. In addition, the threefold division 
of exclusive, shared and Member States competences also goes back to the roots of federal 
constitutional philosophy. This kind of a division of competences implies the principle of 
enumerated competences further reinforcing the federal references. 
However, contrary to that presented earlier, this picture is not as clear as it could be since 
the inclusion of parallel, co-ordinating and supplementary competences also reflect the 
political reality of the recent stage of European integration. Therefore, the “competence 
clause” of the treaties does not have a completely federal nature, as the political compromises 
surrounding the entire constitution-making process had a considerable impact on it. 
 
4. The shortcomings of the recent solution – substantive comments 
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Two insights have been revealed thus far. Firstly, the Lisbon reforms codified the existing 
status quo on the exercise of competences in the European Union. Secondly, the formation 
and the phrasing of the legal framework is of a clear federal nature, both its underlying 
constitutional philosophy and precise wording incorporate essential tenets of a federal 
structure. This last section, however, attempts to formulate some substantial comments by 
highlighting certain controversial points. 
The starting point of this discussion is the simple fact that the recent setting of the vertical 
division of powers in the European Union has seemingly unambiguous federal aspirations. 
Each component – (i.) the inclusion of the competence clause, (ii.) the delimitation of the 
spheres of Union and Member States’ government, (iii.) the general “police power” explicitly 
granted to the Member States, (iv.) the threefold division of competences and (v.) the 
presence of the principle of enumerated competences – underlines the impression that the 
exercise of competences operates on a clear federal basis in the Union. Taking one more step 
forward, this may also lead to a fundamental conclusion. In fact, the European Union, as far 
as the relationship between the supranational and member state levels goes, is a federal entity. 
But is this really true? May we submit that the European Union is a federal constitutional 
structure? Of course, this question, due to the linguistic and conceptual uncertainties, that is, 
the terms federation, federal or federative have a considerable penumbra of uncertainty,
53
 
cannot be answered from a single point of view. Depending on either the approach or the 
given field of study authors may arrive at various conclusions.
54
 In order to contribute to the 
ongoing scholarly discussion this article discusses this problem from a comparative 
perspective. 
From a substantial point of view, the recent setting of division of powers between the 
European Union and the Member States cannot really be compared to traditional federal 
solutions. That being said, the new “competence clause” relying to a great extent on a federal 
constitutional philosophy, logic and vocabulary does not include that many essential powers 
that would be vital for the proper functioning of a real federation. Comparative public law 
points out that real federations have exclusive competence in the field of foreign policy,
55
 
military and defence policy,
56
 or imposing federal taxes thereby founding the federal fiscal 
policy.
57
 Naturally, member states may retain some fragments of the earlier exclusive powers, 
but it should be noted that these cannot compete at all with concomitant federal 
competences.
58
 Indeed, the European Union still lacks these powers, only a very limited and 
sometimes controversial coordination, if any, has started to emerge in these fields.
59
 Member 
                                                 
53
 Cf. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978, pp. 124-125. 
54
 Cf. for example: Lenaerts: supra note 2, p. 747. In this article professor Lenaerts argues that federalism can 
have various interpretations and these also influence us in the understanding of the EU’s structure. Or, Professor 
Schütze pointed out the constitutional structure of the European Union has a clear federal nature, and it can be 
compared to cooperative federalism. Schütze, supra note 4, p. 352.  
55
 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany Art. 73 (1).; The Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Austria Art. 10 (1) 2.; The Constitution of the United States Art I 10 §. 
56
 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany Art. 73 (1).; The Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Austria Art. 10 (1) 15.; The Constitution of the United States Art I 8 §. 
57
 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Austria Art. 10 (1) 4.; The Constitution of the United States Art I 
8 §. 
58
 For example: Art. 32 (3) of the German Basic Law provide certain international treaty-making competences 
for the Member States in relation with their sui generis legislative power. However, the same article also requires 
the consent of the Federal Government to these treaties, thus the federal level has a veto power in this case. 
Moreover the Federal Constitutional Court emphasized in a decision that the Member States cannot have an 
autonomous foreign policy on the basis of this Article. Cf. J. Throne, Federal Constitution and International 
Relations. University of Queensland Press, st. Lucia, 2003, p. 53. 
59
 See for example: Title V Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 Section 1 TEU (Common foreign and security policy), Title 
V Chapter 2 Section 2 TEU (Defining a broad framework for military and defence cooperation), Title VIII 
Chapter 1 TFEU (Economic policy). 
  
States are obviously unwilling to give up, or to partially transfer these areas of action to the 
Union, since they are still regarded as the core elements of national sovereignty. Therefore, 
the supranational government in the EU has considerably less room to act in substantive terms 
than in a truly federal system. 
Furthermore, there are other points in the recent design of the distribution of competences 
that impede the construction of an efficient federal constitutional framework. Almost two 
hundred years ago, when establishing a truly federalist interpretation of the US constitution, 
Chief Justice Marshall argued that the powers of the federal government emanated directly 
from the people.
60
 That is, in Marshall’s opinion the source of the powers of the federal 
government was the people, and not the North-American states. Consequently, the federal 
government could in no way be limited by the states in general, although they certainly had 
such aspirations as reflected by 19
th
 century US constitutional history. As a result of this 
construction, only the Constitution may impose limitations on the acts of the federal 
government, the component states were deprived of this opportunity.
61
  
Marshall’s reasoning, linking the powers of the federal government to the American 
people, simply closed down those lines of constitutional argumentation that may have 
attempted to raise claims based on the sovereignty of the states as a substantial barrier of 
governmental power. In addition to its constitutional relevance, Marshall’s approach had a 
clear political dimension since it made it possible to refute “states’ rights” political claims 
marked by strong republican and anti-federalist features.
62
 
However, it is obvious that such a constitutional approach is unimaginable in the recently 
established setting of the division of powers in the European Union. Article 5 (1) TEU 
declares that the principle of conferral has a crucial role to play in limiting the exercise of 
Union competences, while Article 5 (2) TEU states that “the Union shall act only within the 
limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States”. These provisions have 
detrimental consequence for any federalist argument. The fact that the Union competences are 
limited by the principle of conferral – implying that the Member States intentionally and 
explicitly transferred their powers to the supranational level of government – points out that 
the Member States are the primary source of Union powers – and not the people of Europe. 
The Preamble of the TEU also underlines the primary importance of the Member States in this 
respect. It only refers to the peoples of Europe four times
63
 and it seemingly considers it an 
object of Union’s policies, not an autonomous driving force behind the integration.64 
Therefore, the federalist approach directly linking the supranational level to the people as 
Marshall did in his seminal judgment is prima facie impossible within the constitutional 
context of the European Union. In a similar case, if at all, a reference to Article 5 (1) and 5 (2) 
TEU would immediately invalidate any US-styled federalist speculation. Therefore, federal 
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aspirations attempting both to neutralize the will of Member States in legitimizing the 
exercise of powers of the European Union and strengthen the power of the Union level would 
contravene the prevailing constitutional setting.  
Consequently, Member States can still impose strict limits on the acts of the European 
Union since they are the fundamental source of its powers. This also means that they can 
easily impede a federal expansion of supranational competences.
65
 In essence, the recent state 
of affairs can only be transformed into a more federative one in case the Member States agree 
to such transformation, thus, this seems to be a pure political question. Nowadays, in the era 
of the economic crisis, it is hard to imagine that Member States would give up more 
competence areas in the coming years, since the recent political developments in the 
European Union indicate that sovereignty is still a major concern of Member States in 
general. 
Lastly, it is worthwhile mentioning that even Article 352 TFEU cannot be applied for the 
extension of the powers of the federal level as it happened in the history of US 
constitutionalism.
66
 It is true that this article and its antecedents have played a role that is 
comparable to that of the “necessary and proper” clause of the US Constitution.67 However, 
there are some differences and these call into question whether this article may be invoked as 
efficiently as its US counterpart was applied in order to provide implied powers to the US 
federal government to accomplish its ends. Chief Justice Marshall, when establishing the 
implied powers doctrine in respect to the enumerated powers, relied on both structural and 
textual interpretation. Firstly, he submitted that from the fact that the “necessary and proper” 
clause is situated within the enumerated powers it could be inferred that it was not a simple 
addition, but one of the enumerated powers itself.
68
 Secondly, the phrasing of this clause, that 
is the lack of the adjective “absolutely”, also indicated that the federal government is able to 
choose any appropriate means to make the exercise of its powers efficient.
69
  
Chief Justice Marshall’s linguistic argument is also valid in the context of Article 352 
TFEU. One can find no reference to “absolute” necessity in the text of this provision. This 
article refers to the “policies defined in the Treaties” instead of “powers” as the “necessary 
and proper” clause does in the US Constitution, and no serious doubts can be raised in relation 
to the applicability of the article in establishing implied competences. However, as far as 
structural interpretation goes, the case is obviously different. Article 352 TFEU is not part of 
the section devoted to Union competences, instead, it is located in Part Seven (General and 
Final Provisions).
70
 If one follows Marshall’s argument the only logical conclusion is that 
Article 352 TFEU is not part of the Union powers but an additional provision to be applied in 
special cases. Therefore, it is impossible to argue that this article would be “an express 
recognition of the need to provide additional law-making powers”71 to execute the originally 
enumerated powers. As a result, a US type extension of competences through the recognition 
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of the implied dimensions of enumerated powers must face serious challenges in the 
prevailing legal framework. Therefore, it is questionable if Article 352 TFEU can really be 
regarded as a real “necessary and proper” clause of the European Union constitutional order.72 
In sum, the recent constellation of competence rules – albeit exhibiting a manifest federal 
shape – is far removed from a true federative regime yet. Some essential competences for an 
efficient and real federal way of functioning are still in the more or less exclusive power of 
the Member States. Moreover, the primary role of the principle of conferral as well as the 
position of Article 352 TFEU render any judicial activism leading to a federal transformation 
in respect of competences an illusion. Thus, the exercise of powers in the European Union is 
of a sui generis nature, situated somewhere in halfway between intergovernmental 
cooperation and federalism. 
 
5. Conclusions – the Emperor is certainly not naked but weak 
 
A telling way to formulate some conclusions can be the reconsideration of the famous tale 
by Andersen. This “metaphorical extension” may explain better the recent situation than the 
simple use of the normal language of legal scholarship. Applying the metaphor of the 
“Emperor” to the European Union, one may conclude that the “Emperor” in our case is 
certainly not naked, as was the case in the famous tale, since he got new, well-tailored clothes 
following Lisbon. At the same time he seems manifestly weak especially when compared to 
the other “Emperors” wearing similarly styled clothes. That is, although the Lisbon reforms 
reconsidered the entire framework of the distribution of competences in a seemingly federal 
way, they did not lead to the creation of a properly and efficiently functioning allocation of 
powers. 
The shortcomings of the post-Lisbon regime of competence sharing have already become 
manifest in the last few years. One of the main reasons for the recent stalemate over the 
European debt crisis, with special regard to the fragility of Euro, might be that the European 
Union is unable to act and react as fast and efficient as would have been necessary in a 
European level crisis. The lack of vital exclusive and shared competences, mostly in the area 
of fiscal and foreign policies, hinder the European Union in delivering clear-cut and 
unambiguous responses to constantly emerging challenges. Contrary to all federal efforts, the 
competences necessary for an efficient crisis-management preeminently remained in the 
hands of national governments. These in turn have understandably focused predominantly on 
their own problems, trying to preserve these competences even if most of the problems and 
challenges have a clear trans-national and regional nature.
73
 
In sum, the new federal-like, but essentially hybrid design of the division of powers 
between the European Union and Member States must prove its worthiness in a historically 
unprecedented situation, in the waves of both the global economic crisis and the European 
debt crisis. Perhaps, the Emperor will be able to answer these questions in his new outfit, 
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